Governor George Grey had convinced his superiors of the need for more men. A force of around 1300 British troops and 400 Maori began their advance on Ruapekapeka in early December 1845.
After three weeks hauling 30 tonnes of artillery, men and supplies over nearly 30 kms of rugged country, the British force assembled before Ruapekapeka – the bat’s nest. This highly intricate pa with its tunnels, rifle pits and trenches was surrounded by a strong palisade but its garrison was outnumbered four to one. The British had three naval 32-pounder, an 18-pounder, two 12-pounder howitzers and a number of mortar and rocket tubes. Te Ruki Kawiti had an ancient 12-pounder (which was destroyed shortly after the British commenced shelling the pa) and a 4-pounder.
A fully recovered Hone Heke and 60 reinforcements joined Kawiti inside Ruapekapeka during the night of 9 January 1846. He and Kawiti now had a force of perhaps 500. Their arrival suggests that the British siege was anything but tight.
A full-scale bombardment began on 10 January. Steady and accurate firing created three small breaches in the palisade. Despard was keen to attack before Kawiti’s men could escape but was talked out of this course of action by both by Tamati Waka Nene and Grey (who was present throughout the bombardment).
The conclusion of the battle is shrouded in controversy. The following day, 11 January, it was discovered that the pa was essentially empty. Only Kawiti and around a dozen warriors were left inside. They fired one volley and fled the pa. The British forces followed but were met by fire from Maori hidden in bush outside the pa. Fighting intensified briefly when Kawiti’s men appeared to make a move to regain the pa. The conflict fizzled out when the British refused to get lured into the bush. Maori casualties numbered 30 and British 45 (there is evidence some British were killed by their own side as they ran around the pa looking for loot) .
With the pa in their possession Despard and Grey proclaimed a ‘brilliant success’. Despard wrote that not only had Ruapekapeka been ‘carried by assault’ but a full-sale attempt to regain it had also been repulsed. Grey used Ruapekapeka to establish his credentials with a Pakeha community seeking reassurance as to who was in control of New Zealand.
There were no provisions or ammunition left in the pa, suggesting that this was an organised withdrawal. This might also suggest that the pa had a short intended life span; once it had served its purpose it was simply abandoned. The defenders may also have hoped that the soldiers would follow and be ambushed by Heke and his men in the dense bush outside the pa.
Alternatively Kawiti and his men might have been taking what they saw as their best chance to escape.
Another theory is that as it was a Sunday the Christian Maori had retired outside to attend prayer service. Kawiti, a confirmed non-Christian, and a handful of his men remained inside. The garrison was then caught off guard. When the same forces met at Ohaeawai, though, there was no such acknowledgement of the Sabbath.
The British concept of warfare would have seen the capture of such an intricately designed and well constructed pa as a significant achievement. In this sense Ruapekapeka may have been a tactical victory for the British. But many consider the battle to be a draw. Heke and Kawiti had escaped with their forces largely intact. The terms of the peace settlement that followed suggest that the Maori had enjoyed a strategic victory.
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