The controversies - The Battle for Crete

The controversies

People have argued about the Battle for Crete since it occurred. The Allied forces on the island knew of German intentions, and they had the chance to inflict a humiliating defeat on the Germans — the first they would have suffered on land during the war. Who was responsible for the mistakes that allowed the Germans to gain control of the vital airfield at Maleme and to hold it against the subsequent counter-attack? 

There is debate about the officers responsible for operations in the Maleme sector. The actions of Lieutenant-Colonel L.W. Andrew VC, the commander of 22 Battalion in the crucial positions dominating the airfield, have come under question, and some people think he may have lost his nerve. Andrew's decision to pull back off Hill 107 during the night of 20–21 May opened the way for the Germans to occupy it without opposition on the morning of the 21st. Assuming incorrectly that two of his companies on the edge of the airfield had been overrun, Andrew determined to pull back to occupy defensive positions before daylight, when the Luftwaffe would make such a manoeuvre too dangerous. 

The commanders of the neighbouring battalions, 21 and 23, Lieutenant-Colonels Allen and Leckie respectively, have also been criticised for failing to carry out their pre-invasion orders to counter-attack immediately if the Germans secured a lodgement on the airfield. A failure to perceive the danger, some uncertainty in the pre-invasion orders, and the lack of drive exhibited by their superior ensured that neither battalion intervened to assist 22 Battalion. The suggestion by one historian (Tony Simpson) that Leckie had a nervous breakdown on the first morning, and that this accounts for 23 Battalion's failure to go to 22 Battalion's assistance, can however be discounted. Although Simpson's claim was based on the recollection of an officer of the battalion, several members of the battalion who were present have strongly denounced any suggestion that Leckie was incapacitated and have pointed to the orders he received from his superior, Brigadier James Hargest, 5 Brigade's commander.

Hargest has come under most scrutiny. His lethargy and lack of judgement during the first two days of the battle have placed the spotlight on the circumstances in which he came to be serving with 2NZEF. In 1939 he had been found unfit for overseas service and had secured his commission through his political connections as a member of Parliament. Hargest acquiesced in Andrew's plans to pull back from Hill 107 during the 20th — 'If you must, you must' — and led Leckie and Allen to believe that 22 Battalion was holding its own at Maleme without the need for assistance. The fact that he remained at his headquarters well removed from the scene of action has also been criticised.

Controversy also surrounds the actions of the temporary commander of 2 New Zealand Division, Brigadier Edward Puttick. His failure to order a counter-attack on the German concentration in the Prison Valley on the 20th was perhaps his biggest tactical error of the campaign. He was reluctant to commit his reserves because of a fear of a further paratroop landing, but more especially by the perceived threat from the sea. He too did not take the situation in hand on the first day by ensuring a more aggressive response on Hargest's part.

Creforce commander Major-General B.C. Freyberg has also been the subject of considerable criticism. As overall commander of the Allied forces on Crete, he must take responsibility for the failure. His performance was attacked at the time by several of his subordinates. Hargest, for example, complained to Prime Minister Peter Fraser that he did not 'keep control over the conduct of operations', failed to take his senior officers into his confidence and occasionally left doubts as to his intentions.

Brigadier Inglis also raised doubts about Freyberg's conduct of the battle at a meeting with Churchill in London shortly after the battle. These contemporary criticisms have been echoed more recently by several British historians (Antony Beevor, Callum MacDonald) in light of revelations of the ULTRA intelligence available to Freyberg. They accuse him of muddled thinking and of making a key mistake on 21 May based on a misreading of an ULTRA signal, leading to the counter-attack by 28 and 20 Battalions being fatally delayed on his orders because of an expectation of an imminent seaborne attack. Freyberg made serious tactical errors in both his dispositions (especially in leaving the area west of the Tavronitis River unguarded) and his response to the invasion, but the ULTRA argument is too simplistic as an explanation for the failure of the crucial counter-attack. Even if the launching of that attack was indeed delayed by Freyberg because of a misreading of the signal in question, there can be no certainty that it would have succeeded if it had gone ahead at the earlier time planned, given that it was in two-battalion strength only and the Germans at the airfield had been reinforced by fresh troops the previous day.